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A Game-Theoretic Approach to
Adversarial Linear Support Vector Classification
Farhad Farokhi
Abstract—In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic model to
analyze the interaction between an adversary and a classifier.
There are two classes (i.e., positive and negative classes) to
which data points can belong. The adversary is interested in
maximizing the probability of miss-detection for the positive class
(i.e., false negative probability). The adversary however does
not want to significantly modify the data point so that it still
maintains favourable traits of the original class. The classifier,
on the other hand, is interested in maximizing the probability
of correct detection for the positive class (i.e., true positive
probability) subject to a lower-bound on the probability of correct
detection for the negative class (i.e., true negative probability).
For conditionally Gaussian data points (conditioned on the class)
and linear support vector machine classifiers, we rewrite the
optimization problems of the adversary and the classifier as
convex optimization problems and use best response dynamics
to learn an equilibrium of the game. This results in computing
a linear support vector machine classifier that is robust against
adversarial input manipulations. We illustrate the framework on
a synthetic dataset and a public Cardiovascular Disease dataset.
Index Terms—Binary classification; Linear support vector
machine; Gaussian data; Adversarial machine learning; Game
theory; Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid developments in machine learning techniques is an-
ticipated to boost productivity and spur economic growth. The
potential to extract accurate analytic gives rise to a data-driven
economy which, according to a recent McKinsey report [1], is
estimated to potentially deliver an additional economic output
of around $13 trillion by 2030. This has motivated a world-
wide race to put machine learning in everything ranging from
health sector to aerospace engineering. However, machine
learning systems face security concerns that, up to recently,
have not attracted much attention.
Machine learning algorithms have been observed to be
vulnerable to adversarial manipulations of their inputs after
training and deployment, known as evasion attacks [2]–[4]. In
fact, some machine learning models are shown to be adversely
influenced by very small perturbations to the inputs [3], [5],
[6]. These observations severely restrict their applications in
practice.
Most common methods for securing machine learning algo-
rithms against adversarial inputs are ad hoc in nature or based
on heuristic; see, e.g., [3], [6], [7]. For instance, it has been
shown that injecting adversarial examples into the training set,
often referred to as adversarial training, can increase robust-
ness to adversarial manipulations [3]. However, this approach
F. Farokhi is with the CSIRO’s Data61 and the University of Melbourne.
E-mails: farhad.farokhi@{data61.csiro.au,unimelb.edu.au}
is dependant on the method used for generating adversarial
examples and the number of the required adversarial examples
is often not known a priori.
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach to
model and analyze the interactions between an adversary and
a decision maker (i.e., a classifier). As a starting point for
research, we focus on a binary classification problem using
linear support vector machines with Gaussian-distributed data
in each class. This way, we can compute optimal adversarial
linear support vector machine. Note that the problem of detect-
ing and mitigating evasion attacks in support vector machines
is still an ongoing debate [8], [9] with not much known in
the way of designing robust classifiers, except through adding
adversarial examples to the training dataset (discussed in the
earlier references) or, in a heuristical manner, by changing the
regularization term [10].
We particularly model the interaction between the adversary
and the classifier using a constant-sum game. There are two
classes (i.e, positive and negative classes) to which the data
can belong. The adversary is interested in maximizing the
probability of miss-detection for the positive class, i.e., the
probability of classification of an input belonging to the neg-
ative class while it is from the positive classes, also known as
the false negative probability. However, the adversary does not
want to significantly modify the data so that it still maintains
the favourable traits of the original class. An example of
such a classification problem is a simplified spam filtering
in which the nature of the email determines its class (with
the positive class denoting spam emails). The adversary’s
objective is to modify the spam emails so that they pass the
spam filtering algorithm. Manipulating the email by a large
amount might negate the adversarial nature of spam emails.
Also, note that the adversary cannot access all the emails and
thus can only manipulate the spam emails. The classifier is
interested in maximizing the probability of correct detection
for the positive class, i.e., the probability of classification of an
input belonging to the positive class if it is from the positive
classes, also known as the true positive probability. In the
spam filtering example, the classifier aims to determine if an
email is spam or not based on possibly modified spam email
and unaltered genuine emails. Evidently, if the objective of the
classifier was solely to correctly catch all data points belonging
to the positive class, its optimal behaviour would have been
to ignore the received data point and to mark it as belonging
to the positive class. This would correctly identify all data
points belonging to the positive classes however it also miss-
classifies all data points from the negative class. This is in fact
impractical. For instance, such a policy, in the spam filtering
example, would results in marking all emails as spam, which
2is undesirable. Therefore, the classifier enforces a lower bound
on the probability of correct detection for the negative class,
i.e., the probability of classification of an input belonging to
the negative class if it is from the negative class, also known
as the true negative probability. We rewrite the optimization
problems of the adversary and the classifier as two convex
optimization problems and use a best response dynamics to
learn an equilibrium of the game.
The problem formulation of this paper is in essence close
to cheap-talk games [11]–[13] and Bayesian persuasion [14]–
[16] in which a better-informed sender wants to communicate
with a receiver in a strategic manner to sway its decision.
However, there is a stark difference between those studies
and the setup of this paper. In this paper, the classifier (i.e.,
the receiver) is restricted to follow a machine learning model
(specifically, a linear support vector machine), which is not
necessarily Bayesian.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the game-theoretic problem formulation. Numerical
methods for computing the equilibrium are presented in Sec-
tion III. Numerical examples are presented in Section IV.
Finally, Section V concludes the paper and presents avenues
for future research.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the communication structure between an adversary
and a classifier as in Figure 1.
The adversary has access to a random variable x ∈ Rn,
which can belong to two classes: positive and negative. The
class to which x belongs is denoted by θ ∈ {−1,+1}, which
is a binary random variable itself with P{θ = +1} = 1 −
P{θ = −1} = α > 0. The random variable x is assumed
to be Gaussian with mean µ+ ∈ Rn and co-variance matrix
Σ+ ≻ 0 if θ = +1 and is assumed to be Gaussian with mean
µ− ∈ Rn and co-variance matrix Σ− ≻ 0 if θ = −1. The
notation A ≻ 0 implies that A is a symmetric positive definite
matrix while A  0 implies that A is positive semi-definite.
The adversary communicates a message y ∈ Rn to the
classifier. This message may or may not be truthful. We
assume that y follows
y =
{
Ax+ w, θ = +1,
x, θ = −1, (1)
where A ∈ Rn×n is a weighting matrix and w ∈ Rm is
a Gaussian random variable (i.e., additive Gaussian noise)
with mean µw ∈ Rm and co-variance Σw  0. Let γ :=
(A, µw,Σw) be the policy of the adversary. The set of all
policies of the adversary is denoted by Γ. Note that the
adversary may not be able to access all the data points, e.g.,
all the emails in the spam filtering example discussed in the
introduction, and thus can only manipulate the ones belonging
to the positive class, e.g., spam emails.
In this paper, we restrict the adversary’s policy to be linear.
This is to ensure that the adversary’s abilities is a match for
the classifier (as the classifier is assumed to be linear support
vector machine). Furthermore, the linearity of the adversary
simplifies the analysis due to the Gaussianity of the data
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Fig. 1. Communication structure between an adversary and a classifier playing
the adversarial classification game.
points. This analysis provides a lower bound on the influence
of a more general adversary since they can find more degrees
of freedom for manipulating the data points by extending their
set of strategies to also cover nonlinear mappings.
The classifier intends to determine the class to which the
random variable x actually belongs, based on the received
message y. The decision of the classifier is denoted by
z ∈ {−1,+1} and is determined by a linear support vector
machine classifier:
z = sign(α⊤y + β), (2)
where α ∈ Rn is a vector of weights and β ∈ R is a bias.
Note that scaling both α and β by a positive constant does not
change the sign of α⊤y+β and thus, without loss of generality,
we can assume that ‖α‖∞ ≤ 1 and |β| ≤ 1. Let η := (α, β)
be the policy of the classifier. The set of all policies of the
classifier is denoted by Υ.
The goal of the classifier is to correctly classify as many
cases belonging to the positive class as possible. Therefore,
the classifier wants to maximize
Uc(γ, η) := P{z = +1|θ = +1}. (3)
Evidently, if the objective of the classifier was solely to
maximize P{z = +1|θ = +1}, the optimal behaviour would
have been to set β = 1 and α = 0, i.e., ignore the received
messages and mark it as belonging to the positive class.
This is however impractical, e.g., such a policy in the spam
filtering example results in marking all emails as spam which
is undesirable. Therefore, the set of the actions of the classifier
is constrained by
Cc(γ, η) := P{z = −1|θ = −1} ≥ 1− δ, (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1/2) is a constant. By selecting δ small enough,
we can ensure that data points belonging to the negative class
(e.g., non-spam emails) are almost entirely correctly classified.
In what follows, we use the notation
Ωc(γ) := {η = (α, β) ∈ Υ :Cc(γ, η) ≥ 1− δ,
‖α‖∞ ≤ 1, |β| < 1}. (5)
The goal of the adversary is to deceive the classifier into
miss-classifying more data points from the positive class, e.g.,
accepting more spam emails. This is achieved by maximizing
Ua(γ, η) := P{z = −1|θ = +1}. (6)
However, the adversary does not want to make large changes
to x as that might defeat its original purpose, e.g., in the
spam filtering example, the email might no longer contain the
desirable traits of the spam emails like unsolicited commercial
3advertisements. Conceptually, this can be achieved by ensuring
that the magnitude of the changes is constrained by
Ca(γ, η) := E{‖x− y‖22|θ = +1} ≤ ǫ, (7)
where ǫ > 0 is a constant. Although, in this paper, we
consider a constraint on the variance of the manipulations,
the analysis can be readily extended to other constraints, e.g.,
mean absolute deviations. In what follows, we use the notation
Ωa(η) := {γ ∈ Γ : Ca(γ, η) ≤ ǫ}. (8)
Definition 1 (Adversarial Classification Game). An adversar-
ial classification game is defined as a strategic game between
two players: an adversary and a classifier. The utilities of
the adversary and the classifier are Uc(γ, η) and Ua(γ, η),
respectively. The action spaces of the adversary and the
classifier are Ωc(γ, η) and Ωa(γ, η), respectively.
In the language of [17], an adversarial classification game
is in fact a competitive economy as the action spaces of the
players potentially depends on the actions of the other players.
In this paper, we use game instead of competitive economy in
line with more recent game theory literature.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). A pair of policies (γ∗, η∗) consti-
tutes an equilibrium if
γ∗ ∈ argmax
γ∈Ωa(η∗)
Ua(γ, η
∗), (9a)
η∗ ∈ argmax
η∈Ωc(γ∗)
Uc(γ
∗, η). (9b)
With these definitions in hand, we are ready to present the
results of the paper.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We can prove an important result regarding the adversarial
classification game illustrating the direct conflict of interest
between the adversary and the classifier, as expected.
Proposition 1 (Constant-Sum Game). The adversarial classi-
fication game is a constant-sum game.
Proof: Note that Uc(γ, η) + Ua(γ, η) = P{z = +1|θ =
+1}+ P{z = −1|θ = +1} = 1 for any γ and η.
In the the remainder of this section, we provide a method
for computing equilibria of an adversarial classification game.
We first show that the best responses of the players can be
computed using convex optimizations. In what follows, erf :
R → [0, 1] denotes the error function, defined as erf(x) :=
(
∫ x
−x exp(−t2)dt)/
√
π.
Theorem 1. Let (γ∗, η∗) be such that (1) and (2) holds with
probability one with the following parameters:
A = A/t1, µw = µw/t1,Σw = RwR
⊤
w/t1,
α = α/max{‖α‖∞, |β|}, β = β/max{‖α‖∞, |β|},
where (A, µw, Rw, Z
′, t1) is given by
argmax
A,µ
w
,Rw,Z′,t
− α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β (10a)
s.t.


1√
2
I 0 R⊤wα
0 Σ−1+ A
⊤
α
α⊤Rw α⊤A t

  0, (10b)
trace(Z ′) ≤ tǫ, (10c)

tI 0 0 R⊤w
0 t 0 µ⊤w
0 0 t(Σ++µ+µ
⊤
+)
−1 tI −A⊤
Rw µw tI −A Z ′

0,
(10d)
t ≥ 0. (10e)
and (α, β, t2) is given by
argmax
α,β,t
α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β, (11a)
s.t. 2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α ≤ 1, (11b)
− α⊤µ− − β ≥ erf−1 (1− 2δ) t, (11c)∥∥∥√2Σ1/2− α∥∥∥
2
≤ t, (11d)
t ≥ 0. (11e)
Then (γ∗, η∗) is an equilibrium of the adversarial classifica-
tion game.
Proof: Let us consider the classifier. The utility of the
classifier can be simplified as
Uc(γ, η) =P{z = +1|θ = +1}
=P{α⊤y + β > 0|θ = +1}
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
)
,
where the last equality follows from that α⊤y+β, conditioned
on the observation that θ = +1, is a Gaussian random variable
with the following mean and variance:
E{α⊤y + β|θ = +1} = α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β,
Var(α⊤y + β|θ = +1) = α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α.
Because erf(·) is an increasing function, maximizing
Uc(γ, η) is equivalent to minimizing (−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) −
β)/(
√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α). The constraint of the classifier
can also be rewritten as
Cc(γ, η) =P{z = −1|θ = −1}
=P{α⊤y + β < 0|θ = −1}
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
−α⊤µ− − β√
2α⊤Σ−α
)
where the last equality again follows from that α⊤y + β,
conditioned on the observation that θ = −1, is a Gaussian
random variable with the following mean and variance:
E{α⊤y + β|θ = −1} = α⊤µ− + β,
Var(α⊤y + β|θ = −1) = α⊤Σ−α.
4The constraint that Cc(γ, η) ≥ 1− δ is equivalent to
erf
(
−α⊤µ− − β√
2α⊤Σ−α
)
≥ 1− 2δ.
Again, because erf(·) is an increasing function, we can rewrite
the classifier’s constraint as
−α⊤µ− − β√
2α⊤Σ−α
≥ δ′ := erf−1 (1− 2δ) .
Note that erf−1 (1− 2δ) > 0 because δ ∈ (0, 1/2). These
derivations allow us to transform the optimization problem
in (9b) into
max
α,β
α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
, (12a)
s.t.
−α⊤µ− − β√
2α⊤Σ−α
≥ δ′, (12b)
‖α‖∞ ≤ 1, (12c)
|β| ≤ 1. (12d)
We use the approach of [18] for the constraint to eliminate the
fractional constraint. We define the change of variables:
g =
1√
2α⊤Σ−α
, α˜ =
1√
2α⊤Σ−α
α, β˜ =
1√
2α⊤Σ−α
β.
Hence, we can rewrite (12) as
max
α,β
α˜⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β˜√
2α˜⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α˜
, (13a)
s.t. − α˜⊤µ− − β˜ ≥ δ′ (13b)
2α˜⊤Σ−α˜ ≤ 1, (13c)
‖α˜‖∞ ≤ g, (13d)
|β˜| ≤ g. (13e)
We can drop the last two inequalities noting that we can set
g = max{‖α∗‖∞, |β∗|}, where
(α∗, β∗) ∈ argmax
α,β
α˜⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β˜√
2α˜⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α˜
, (14a)
s.t. − α˜⊤µ− − β˜ ≥ δ′, (14b)
2α˜⊤Σ−α˜ ≤ 1. (14c)
Again, we use the approach of [18], but this time for the utility,
to rewrite this fractional optimization problem. To do so, define
t =
1√
2α˜⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α˜
α =
1√
2α˜⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α˜
α˜,
β =
1√
2α˜⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α˜
β˜,
Following [18], the optimization problem in (14) is equivalent
with
max
α,β,t
α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) + β, (15a)
s.t. 2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ + Σw)α ≤ 1, (15b)
− α⊤µ− − β ≥ δ′t, (15c)∥∥∥√2Σ1/2− α∥∥∥
2
≤ t, (15d)
t ≥ 0. (15e)
Now, we consider the adversary. The utility of the adversary
is given by
Ua(γ, η) =P{z = −1|θ = +1}
=1− P{z = +1|θ = +1}
=1− Uc(γ, η)
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
)
Hence, because erf(·) is an increasing function, maximizing
Ua(γ, η) is the same as maximizing (−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw) −
β)/
√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α. Furthermore, the constraint of
the adversary can be rewritten as
Ca(γ, η) =E{‖x− y‖22|θ = +1}
=E{‖(I −A)x− w‖22|θ = +1}
=trace((I −A)(Σ+ + µ+µ⊤+)(I − A)⊤)
+ trace(µwµ
⊤
w +Σw)
Following these derivations, we can transform the optimization
problem in (9a) to
max
A,Σw,µw
−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
(16a)
s.t. trace((I −A)(Σ+ + µ+µ⊤+)(I −A)⊤)
+ trace(µwµ
⊤
w +Σw) ≤ ǫ, (16b)
Σw  0. (16c)
Note that the inequality constraint (16b) can be replaced with
the following three constraints:
(I −A)(Σ+ + µ+µ⊤+)(I −A)⊤ + µwµ⊤w +Σw Z, (17a)
Z 0, (17b)
trace(Z) ≤ǫ. (17c)
Further, the constraint (17a) can be linearized using its Schur
complement because Σ+ ≻ 0 to get[
(Σ+ + µ+µ
⊤
+)
−1 I −A⊤
I −A Z − Σw − µwµ⊤w
]
 0. (18)
Again, we can use the Schur complement, to transform the
constraint (18) into
 1 0 µ⊤w0 (Σ+ + µ+µ⊤+)−1 I −A⊤
µw I −A Z − Σw

  0. (19)
5Therefore, the optimization problem in (16) can be trans-
formed into
max
A,Σw,µw,Z
−α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
(20a)
s.t.

 1 0 µ⊤w0 (Σ+ + µ+µ⊤+)−1 I −A⊤
µw I −A Z − Σw

  0,
(20b)
Z  0, (20c)
trace(Z) ≤ ǫ, (20d)
Σw  0. (20e)
Define
t =
1√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
,
A =
1√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
A,
µw =
1√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
µw,
Σw =
1√
2α⊤(AΣ+A⊤ +Σw)α
Σw.
Following [18], the optimization problem in (20) is equivalent
with
max
A,Σw ,µw,Z,t
− α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β (21a)
s.t. α⊤(AΣ+A
⊤
+ tΣw)α
√
2 ≤ t, (21b)
 t 0 µ
⊤
w
0 t(Σ+ + µ+µ
⊤
+)
−1 tI −A⊤
µw tI −A tZ − Σw

  0,
(21c)
trace(Z) ≤ ǫ, (21d)
Σw  0, Z  0, t ≥ 0. (21e)
Using the Schur complement of (21b) and defining Z ′ = tZ ,
we can transform (21) into
max
A,Σw,µw,Z
′,t
− α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β (22a)
s.t.
[
Σ−1+ A
⊤
α
α⊤A t− tα⊤Σwα
√
2
]
 0, (22b)
trace(Z ′) ≤ tǫ, (22c)
 t 0 µ
⊤
w
0 t(Σ+ + µ+µ
⊤
+)
−1 tI −A⊤
µw tI −A Z ′ − Σw

  0,
(22d)
Σw  0, (22e)
t ≥ 0. (22f)
Algorithm 1 Learning an equilibrium of the adversarial clas-
sification game.
Require: ̟ ∈ (0, 1)
Ensure: γ(k), η(k)
1: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: Compute (A, µw, Rw, Z
′, t1) by solving (10) for fixed
(α(k)⊤, β(k))
3: Update
A(k+1) ←
(
1− ̟
k
)
A(k) +
̟
k
1
t1
A,
µ(k+1)w ←
(
1− ̟
k
)
µ(k)w +
̟
k
1
t1
µw,
Σ(k+1)w ←
(
1− ̟
k
)
Σ(k)w +
̟
k
1
t1
R⊤wRw.
4: Compute (α, β, t2) by solving (11) for fixed
(A(k), µ
(k)
w ,Σ
(k)
w )
5: Update
α(k+1) ←
(
1− ̟
k
)
α(k) +
̟
k
1
max{‖α‖∞, |β|}
α,
β(k+1) ←
(
1− ̟
k
)
β(k) +
̟
k
1
max{‖α‖∞, |β|}
β.
6: end for
By defining Rw such that RwR
⊤
w = tΣw and using the Schur
complements of (22b) and (22d), we can transform (22) into
max
A,Rw,µw,Z
′,t
− α⊤(Aµ+ + µw)− β
s.t.


1√
2
I 0 R⊤wα
0 Σ−1+ A
⊤
α
α⊤Rw α⊤A t

  0,
trace(Z ′) ≤ tǫ,

tI 0 0 R⊤w
0 t 0 µ⊤w
0 0 t(Σ++µ+µ
⊤
+)
−1 tI −A⊤
Rw µw tI −A Z ′

0,
t ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof.
We can use the best response dynamics, summarized in
Algorithm 1, to extract an equilibrium of the game. The
iterates in Algorithm 1 converge to an equilibrium of the
adversarial classification game. The convergence of the best
response dynamics follows from [19] because of the constant-
sum nature of the game; see Proposition 1.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the applicability of the devel-
oped game-theoretic framework on two numerical problems:
an illustrative example using Gaussian data and a practical
example using real data on heart disease classification.
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(a) Non-adversarial (b) Naı¨ve classifier (c) Equilibrium
Fig. 2. Illustration of the effect of the adversary on linear support vector machine classifiers using synthetic Gaussian data. There is no adversary in the
non-adversarial case. The naı¨vete case refers to the case that the classifier is not prepared to respond to the adversary. The equilibrium of the game is recovered
by Algorithm 1. The optimal non-adversarial and adversarial support vector machines are illustrated with dashed and solid lines, respectively. The original
data points from the positive class are shown by the red pluses and the data points from the negative class are shown by the blue squares. The manipulated
data points from the positive class are shown by the black triangles.
A. Illustrative Example
Consider an example in which the data for the positive
and negative classes are Gaussian random variables with the
following means and co-variance matrices:
µ+ =
[
3
3
]
, µ− =
[
0
0
]
,Σ+ =
[
1 0
0 1/5
]
,Σ− =
[
1/5 0
0 1
]
.
For the following experiments 500 data points from each class
are randomly generated to illustrate the effects of the adversary
and the classifier.
We first consider there is no adversary. In this case, the
classifier is merely interested in identifying the optimal linear
support vector machine by maximizing the true positive prob-
ability subject to a constraint that the true negative probability
is greater than or equal to 1 − δ = 0.99. Figure 2 (a) shows
the optimal non-adversarial support vector machine with the
dashed line. The data points from the positive class are shown
by the red pluses and the data points from the negative class
are shown by the blue squares. In this case, the true negative
probability is 0.99 and the true positive probability (which is
equal to one minus the false negative probability) is 0.9993.
This high performance is of course an artifact of the setup
of the example in which the data points for both classes are
linearly separable with high probability and mixing is only
due to outliers.
Now, let the classifier select this optimal non-adversarial
support vector machine as its policy. Assume that the adver-
sary can now manipulate the data in the positive class but the
classifier is not prepared to respond to these manipulations.
The adversary is interested in manipulating the data from
the positive class in order to maximize the false negative
probability subject to a bound on the expected variance of
the changes with ǫ = 2. Figure 2 (b) the effect of the
adversary on the performance of this naı¨ve classifier. The
naı¨vete refers to that the classifier is not prepared to respond to
the adversary. The manipulated data points from the positive
TABLE I
THE EFFECT OF ADVERSARY ON LINEAR SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
CLASSIFIERS USING THE CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE DATASET. THERE IS
NO ADVERSARY IN THE NON-ADVERSARIAL CASE. THE NAI¨VETE CASE
REFERS TO THE CASE THAT THE CLASSIFIER IS NOT PREPARED TO
RESPOND TO THE ADVERSARY. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME IS
RECOVERED BY ALGORITHM 1.
True negative probability False negative probability
P{z = −1|θ = −1} P{z = −1|θ = +1}
Non-adversarial 0.8986 0.2000
Naı¨ve classifier 0.8986 0.9758
Equilibrium 0.9130 0.6303
class are depicted by the black triangles. Similarly, the original
data points from the positive class are shown by red pluses and
the data points from the negative class are shown by the blue
squares. In this case, the false negative probability increases
493% in comparison to the non-adversarial case. This is of
course due to unprepared, naı¨ve nature of the classifier.
Now, consider the case where the classifier uses the optimal
linear support vector machine extracted from the equilibrium
of the game extracted by Algorithm 1. In this case, it is
also in the benefit of the adversary to employ its optimal
manipulation policy corresponding to the equilibrium of the
game. Figure 2 (c) shows the optimal adversarial support
vector machine with the solid line (compare with the non-
adversarial support vector machine depicted still by the dashed
line). Again, the manipulated data points from the positive
class are shown by the black triangles, the original data points
from the positive class are shown by red pluses, and the data
points from the negative class are shown by the blue squares.
By employing the optimal adversarial support vector machine,
the classifier can reduce the false negative probability 56% in
comparison to the naı¨ve case.
7B. Heart Disease
In this section, we use the Cardiovascular Disease dataset on
Kaggle [20]. The dataset contains age, height, weight, gender,
Systolic and Diastolic blood pressures, Cholesterol level, Glu-
cose level as well as smocking, drinking, and activity levels of
70,000 individuals.There are two classes of individuals: those
with no heart disease (negative class) and those with a heart
disease (positive class).
Consider the case where an adversary is interested in miss-
classifying an individual from the positive class. This could
be motivated by that the adversary wants to forge medical
documents with minimal changes to pass a life insurance
test. For the sake of numerical stability, we scale the data
with the inverse of the Cholesky factor of the co-variance
matrix of the data. This is just to ensure that all the entries
of the data are of the same size. This is indeed a linear
transformation whose effect can be compensated for in the
linear support vector machine and the linear manipulations of
the adversary. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in using
this transformation.
To be able to use the developed framework, we fit Gaussian
density functions to data points for each class and follow
the approach of this paper for designing the classifier and
computing the optimal manipulation by the adversary. In what
follows, we set δ = 10−1 and ǫ = 1. Table I shows the effect
of the adversary on the linear support vector machine classifier.
Although our Gaussian assumption might not be entirely valid,
the optimal non-adversarial support vector machine almost
meets the constraints on the true negative probability (with
true negative probability of 0.8986 instead of 1−δ = 0.9000).
In the naı¨ve case, the adversary can use the ignorance of
the classifier to improve the false negative probability by
488%; nearly all individuals from the positive class can be
made to pass the test. Following the equilibrium extracted by
Algorithm 1, the performance of the adversary is degraded
by 35%. This is of course a significant improvement for
the classifier. To be able to further reduce the false negative
probability, we need to increase δ. This portrays the trade-off
that the classifier faces.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We used a constant-sum game to model the interaction
between an adversary and a classifier. For Gaussian data and
linear support vector machine classifiers, we transformed the
optimization problems of the adversary and the classifier to
convex optimization problems. We then utilized best response
dynamics to learn an equilibrium of the game in order to
extract linear support vector machine classifiers that are robust
to adversarial input manipulations.
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